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 Abstract 
 Manipulative discourse has attracted a lot of attention in various adjacent domains of linguistic 
research, notably in rhetoric, argumentation theory, philosophy of language, discourse analysis, 
pragmatics, among others. We start with a review of the existing deﬁ nitions provided in these 
ﬁ elds and highlight some of the diﬃ  culties they encounter. In particular, we argue that there is 
still a need for an analytic model that makes predictions about manipulative discourse. We pro-
pose an alternative account of manipulation couched in the relevance-theoretic framework 
which treats manipulation as a two-step communicative attempt at misleading the context-
selection process when interpreting a target utterance. We argue further that such attempts sys-
tematically exploit the inherent weaknesses or ﬂ aws of the human cognitive system that are 
amply discussed in cognitive psychology under the heading of “cognitive illusions”. We claim 
that such a model correctly captures classical instances of manipulative discourse which fall 
outside the scope of other accounts. 
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 Introduction 
 Although the distinction between verbal manipulation and alternative non-
manipulative means by which speakers may get their addressees to engage in a 
particular course of action or to believe the truth of certain propositions is 
fairly intuitive, a consistent theoretical model of the former is not available 
yet. Scholars from disciplines in the Humanities as varied as social psychology, 
philosophy, anthropology, communication science, argumentation theory, 
linguistics, psychology and critical discourse analysis have tried to tackle 
the phenomenon or to explore some of its facets, but consensus, let alone a 
uniﬁ ed account, has not been reached yet. Th e reason for this, in our opinion, 
relates to the heterogeneous nature of manipulation; most of these approaches 
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indeed focus on some of its particular aspects, but do not – and sometimes 
cannot – take a step further to consider the phenomenon comprehensively. 
Answering the “what” question (“what is manipulative communication?”) is a 
very diﬃ  cult task, in so far as the identiﬁ cation of manipulation as a commu-
nicative phenomenon proves to be problematic with regard to a goal of 
descriptive adequacy. Contemporary approaches, in this line of work, have 
tried to bring forth several criteria in order to assess what it is that makes a 
discourse manipulative; yet the question is far from being settled, as we will 
see further along. 
 Our proposal aims at reviewing these criteria and explores a relatively new 
direction for research on manipulation, i.e. a cognitive one. In section 1 we 
will discuss some of the criteria that have been proposed to characterise 
manipulation. Th ese are truth-conditionality violation, speaker interest, co -
vertness, social inequality and intention. We will show how none of these 
may constitute a necessary condition for manipulation, as they might consti-
tute an obstacle to providing an operative criterion in order for a theore -
tical model to be adequate from a descriptive point of view. Some of these 
criteria, we will also argue, fail to make the right predictions as they either 
over-generate or under-generate. Consequently we will suggest that studying 
this phenomenon may beneﬁ t from a shift of perspective. Building on the 
assumption that manipulation gains its eﬀ ectiveness through the manipulated 
individual’s processing of the manipulative input, section 2 will review litera-
ture on cognitive processing of linguistic information, in order to establish the 
inherent risk associated to meaning derivation and to defend the idea that 
manipulation may actually exploit the fact that “errors” are likely to occur in 
speech processing. In this respect, we take on board Rigotti’s idea according to 
which “the dynamics of manipulation are very close to the dynamics of human 
error” (2005: 69). Th is hypothesis will draw on contemporary research in 
psychology and cognitive pragmatics (e.g. Pohl,  2004 ; Sperber & Wilson, 
 1995 ). Section 3 will in turn develop the idea and sketch out a pragmatic 
model which accounts for the way manipulators may actually induce such 
“undue” processing. Th is alternative analytical approach will allow us to recon-
sider the nature of manipulative discourse and to provide a new deﬁ nitional 
framework to the processes involved in manipulation. In order to do so we 
propose to integrate the complexity inherently associated with the heteroge-
neous nature of manipulation by focusing our attention on the processes 
involved in the actual success of the manipulative attempt (i.e. the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in speech processing). In other words, we will try to 
understand the “whatness” of manipulation by answering the “how does it 
work” question from a cognitive point of view. In doing so we will address 
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a point recently raised by Cummings (2004: 178ﬀ  ) who emphasises that while 
there exists a clear potential for a pragmatic analysis of argumentation phe-
nomena and their governing principles, (neo-)Gricean pragmatic models have 
not been applied to this domain, which renders “[p]ragmatic studies of argu-
mentative principles […] all the more urgent […]” (Cummings, 2004: 185). 
 1. Th e Heterogeneous Nature of Manipulation: Available Clues 
 Contemporary research on manipulation has usually been concerned with the 
nature of the manipulative message, its properties, and the social conditions in 
which manipulation is likely to occur. Th is section discusses the limits encoun-
tered by such accounts which try to isolate the necessary features that make 
up manipulative discourse. Ultimately, we will propose that the identiﬁ cation 
of manipulation may not be as informative, from a scientiﬁ c point of view, as 
an account of the mechanisms by which manipulation may be successful. 
 1.1. Truth-Conditions and Felicity Conditions 
 Truth and felicity conditions have been proposed as relevant criteria deﬁ ning 
manipulative strategies in terms of falsity and insincerity (Rigotti,  2005 ); the 
main assumption behind this view roughly amounts to considering that some 
of the manipulative message’s features, in terms of the content it encodes, do 
not comply with the communicative standards of verbal interaction. 1 Th is is the 
point made by Rigotti, who suggests that in manipulation, “what is negative has 
to be somehow disguised as something positive”, and that manipulation “twists 
the vision of the world […] in the mind of the addressee” (2005: 68). Typically, 
lies would fall under this category, since it is crucial for a lie’s success to be taken 
as a truthful statement. If a child lies to his parents by telling them that he did 
not break a valuable vase, 2 it might be argued that he has tried to be manipula-
tive. Similarly, insincere promises, such as those politicians might utter in 
  1 In terms of speech act theory, this amounts to saying that a manipulative utterance generally 
violates some felicity conditions of the speech act at stake, or, from a Gricean perspective, that it 
 covertly violates the Cooperative Principle and possibly the conversational maxims. 
  2 Th e lie itself is merely about providing a false statement while asserting it as a truth; more-
over, if the child provides an alternative explanation, by for instance convincingly blaming the 
dog instead and thus avoiding potential punishment, we could say the child’s contribution was 
manipulative, in so far as it is further constraining the parents’ processing of information by 
providing a plausible context to explain the situation. 
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  3 In this example, the felicity (and by “unorthodox” extension, its truth) of the statement is a 
function of the sincerity with which it is uttered, hence the truth-functional violation. 
support of their future election, can also turn out to be manipulative, as they 
may break the sincerity conditions which deﬁ ne a promise. 3 
 However, it seems diﬃ  cult to regard a false statement as a necessary or even 
as a suﬃ  cient condition for manipulation to take place, as Rigotti himself 
(2005) acknowledges. First of all, there is strong evidence in favour of alterna-
tive manipulative mechanisms which do not involve lying. Such is the case, for 
instance, when a speaker provides a plausible justiﬁ cation for a proposition 
which complies with an actual state of aﬀ airs, while the real motivation for her 
statement is not the one she makes manifest, but one which she wants to keep 
concealed, while at the same time obtaining the desired eﬀ ect on the addressee. 
In this ﬁ rst type, the manipulative strategy relies on shifting the addressee’s 
attention as it were, stating  A (which is true) so as to hide the truth of a propo-
sition  B which would weaken or contradict the view entertained by the 
speaker. 
 Along this line of thought, Parret ( 1978 ) argues that lying is limited to 
cases where a speaker communicates a false proposition which misleads the 
hearer into entertaining a new belief, while manipulation may function in 
several diﬀ erent ways: for example, the communication of a proposition may 
mislead the addressee into giving up a legitimate belief, into reinforcing a 
problematic belief or into preventing him from entertaining a legitimate 
belief, all of which can be achieved without resorting to lying on the speaker’s 
part, which would, therefore, be diﬃ  cult to capture either by the restrictions 
imposed by the very notion of lying or through an account based solely on the 
notion of truth. What this shows, beyond Parret’s analysis, is that truth turns 
out to be an insuﬃ  cient criterion when it comes to characterising manipula-
tive communication. 
 Secondly, some researchers point out that the manipulative status of a lie 
may even be questioned in a few cases: the case of parents telling their children 
about Santa Claus raises this particular issue, as highlighted by Saussure & 
Schulz when they argue that “it would be counter-intuitive that the parent 
telling the child about Santa Claus is performing manipulation” (2005: 2). If 
we are simply looking at the nature of the message parents make manifest to 
their child by talking about Santa Claus, truth-conditions are indeed violated, 
and, speciﬁ cally, the existential presupposition. However, existential presup-
position is also violated when parents tell tales about unicorns, and more gen-
erally, when a speaker’s utterance is about ﬁ ction. Although it could be said 
that there is a diﬀ erence between Santa Claus and unicorns in that children are 
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 4 In fact, we believe that making the manipulative intention explicit would make the manipu-
lative attempt collapse altogether. We take this to be in the very nature of manipulation: a 
manipulative intention is not meant to be communicated nor recognised (see sections 1.3 and 
1.5 below). 
aware that unicorns are to be found in fairy tales only, while they can reason-
ably be taken to believe in the actual existence of Santa Claus in the real world, 
to the extent that it might even have a tangible eﬀ ect on their behaviour (being 
good all year in view of getting presents at Christmas), there is  a priori no 
reason to assume that truth-conditions are responsible for that diﬀ erence. Be 
that as it may, it could still be argued that the deliberate use of a false state-
ment is manipulative, as long as the addressee is not aware of it; that is, if we 
consider that the hearer’s processing of information turns out to be biased by 
virtue of the constraints the speaker imposes on the message. Of course, from 
a somewhat more ethical and less technical point of view, we might express 
reservations to call the Santa Claus lie manipulation, as Saussure & Schulz 
(2005) do, simply because the example seems radically diﬀ erent from one 
where a cult guru manages to manipulate his followers and gets them to will-
ingly give him large amounts of money, or, more dramatically, to give up their 
own lives, as was the case a few years ago with the sadly famous Order of the 
Solar Temple collective suicide. But this is a separate question, and deﬁ ning 
manipulation in terms of moral or ethical acceptability would call for discus-
sions that exceed the scope of the present paper, although it does suggest 
that a discussion about the manipulative status of lies bears technical as well 
as ethical implications, since it involves far more than unsatisﬁ ed truth-
conditions. 
 From a speech-act-theoretical perspective, it could be envisaged to consider 
that manipulation violates felicity conditions, and among them, the sincerity 
condition in particular; we mentioned earlier in this respect the scenario of 
a politician uttering a commissive without actually being committed to the 
ulterior satisfaction of the propositional content conveyed. However, if one 
were to deﬁ ne manipulation within a speech-act-theoretic framework, a major 
problem, discussed by Parret ( 1978 ), would emerge: it is the idea that the 
speech act of manipulation cannot comply with the principle of expressibility 
(cf. Searle, 1969) because it cannot be translated with an explicit performative 
such as “I manipulate you + propositional content”. 4 Th erefore, trying to 
couch a deﬁ nition of manipulation in terms of felicity conditions would not 
take us very far; as Parret ( 1978 ) noted: the notion of manipulation as a speech 
act is either self-destructive or it destroys the conceptual frame itself, were it to 
be elaborated in terms of speech act theory. Th at is to say that manipulation is 
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 5 See Lumsden ( 2008 ) for a state-of-the art discussion of the distinction between linguistic 
and extra-linguistic goals from a neo-Gricean perspective. 
a kind of speech act which is not meant to be recognised at all, not even indi-
rectly. What these observations indicate is that deﬁ ning manipulation accord-
ing to truth or felicity conditions leaves too many holes in the model. 
 1.2. Speaker Interest 
 Th e notion of speaker interest has been highlighted by many researchers as one 
key feature of manipulation (e.g. van Dijk, 2006; Rigotti,  2005 ; Saussure & 
Schulz,  2005 ). Th e claim is that manipulation is an intrinsically goal-oriented 
phenomenon designed to satisfy speaker interest. As van Dijk notes (2006: 
360), “manipulators make others believe or do things that are in the interest of 
the manipulator and against the best interests of the manipulated”. Saussure 
also highlights the connexion between speaker interest and the manipulative 
attempt:
 […] communication is manipulative when the speaker retains some relevant 
information, or provides the correct information in order for the hearer to con-
clude that he should behave in a way which favours the speaker’s interests, with-
out being aware of it. (2005: 119-120) 
 Th e notion of interest is intimately linked to that of goal. An interest can be 
deﬁ ned as a goal that an individual might reasonably be taken to be willing to 
attain. It should be noted that in communication there are properly linguistic 
goals (i.e. somewhat “local” goals pursued in the processing of information 
itself ) and extra-linguistic goals (“global” goals, such as the pursuit of happi-
ness, well-being, receiving favours, etc.). 5 Communication, including manip-
ulative communication, cannot take place unless the message conveyed is 
understood by the addressee. In this sense, it could be regarded as one of the 
speaker’s basic interests to intend that her message be adequately interpreted. 
Consequently, it would make little sense to use this acceptance of  interest to 
describe manipulation. We therefore take it that when researchers discuss the 
issue of interest satisfaction in manipulation, they do so mostly with extra-
linguistic interests in mind. 
 Now, several problems arise when examining the issue in further detail. First 
of all, would it be possible for manipulation to favour the addressee’s interest? 
In other words, is it possible to manipulate people to their own advantage? 
Although this question might receive a negative answer at ﬁ rst sight, we argue 
that a positive answer should be preferred in a number of cases. Let us take an 
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 6 We could indeed always consider that manipulation runs contrary to at least some of the 
hearer’s interests; however, contrary to a widespread take on manipulation, we do think that it is 
possible to manipulate people to their own advantage. Th is suggests that what makes a statement 
manipulative is not whether it is detrimental in any way to the hearer; we would rather 
example: two friends, one of which is suﬀ ering from a severe, potentially ter-
minal illness, are having a conversation about medical treatments. Assume 
also that the latter has a phobia about needles and cannot stand the thought 
of being stung. Further assume that his friend just heard on the news that a 
new injection-based treatment which, in some cases, can cure the disease, and 
which considerably alleviates pain in all cases, has just been made available at 
the local hospital. What would we make of the communicative conditions, if 
the healthy speaker manages to get his sick friend to go to the hospital without 
disclosing the nature of the treatment? It can hardly be claimed that this is an 
instance of hearer interest violation, to the extent that both participants in the 
exchange can reasonably be taken to pursue the satisfaction of the sick hearer’s 
interest (i.e. to get better). Yet, we claim that this is an example of manipula-
tion, notwithstanding the absence of hearer interest violation. And in this 
case, speaker and hearer interest do reasonably converge, at least in regard to 
the goal of improving the hearer’s health. Of course, one could argue that 
in spite of this particular convergence, an asymmetrical conﬁ guration still 
remains here, in that the manipulative attempt runs contrary to the hearer’s 
phobia of needles. Yet it seems to us that there is room to consider that it was 
intended to fulﬁ l a “higher-order” interest; in other words, the success of this 
particular manipulative attempt involves the subordination of the violation 
of the secondary “avoid-phobia” interest to the satisfaction of the “improve-
health” interest. Here the manipulative goal is foremost to improve the per-
son’s health, not to trick him into getting stung in spite of his phobia, and so 
we would say that in this particular case, the real motivation of the manipula-
tive attempt translates into a convergence of speaker and hearer interest. 
 People do have conﬂ icting interests, but this does not mean that manipula-
tion is only about violating a hearer’s interest: some violations, which in this 
sense can appear to be incidental, may happen in the pursuit of a goal which, 
in the end, satisﬁ es one of the hearer’s main interests. What we wanted to stress 
with this example is that the consideration of  both speaker and hearer antago-
nistic interests is not necessary to describe manipulation; examples such as that 
given above illustrate that manipulation, at least in principle, does not necessar-
ily require the satisfaction of speaker interest  at the expense of the hearer’s inter-
est. Th is counter-example casts doubt on van Dijk’s take, according to which 
manipulation favours speaker interest  and runs contrary to hearer interest. 6 
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 A second problem with the operability of the notion of interest lies in its rela-
tivity. What may be considered as a legitimate satisfaction of interest for some-
one may not be for someone else. What is more, there seems to be room to 
question the legitimacy of the researcher’s own judgment: on which grounds can 
we say that a researcher’s judgment is accurate when it comes to assessing peo-
ple’s interests? Th ese questions bring up the classical issue of the analyst’s own 
(ideological) bias, and could deﬁ nitely turn out to be problematic should the 
notion of interest be a central part of a systematic account of manipulation. 
 What these two issues point to is that we cannot expect the notion of speaker 
interest to function on a descriptive level in order to account for manipula-
tion. While we do acknowledge that a component of the deﬁ nition of manip-
ulation relates to interest satisfaction, we also consider that if the analyst 
chooses to rely on it on a descriptive level, s/he must be prepared to accept that 
her/his account might prove diﬃ  cult to apply analytically, since (i) it may 
involve ideologically-loaded reasoning, and (ii) it might also face the problem 
of ﬁ nding manipulative strategies in every utterance. 
 1.3. Covertness 
 A very intuitive and widespread view on manipulation holds that in order to 
succeed, the manipulative attempt must remain covert. Quite straightfor-
wardly, we could indeed assume that it is likely that manipulation will fail if 
spotted. Furthermore, there are reasons to doubt that manipulators would 
explicitly endorse their manipulative behaviour in communication. Th ese pre-
liminary remarks tend to conﬁ rm that it is necessary for manipulation to work 
to go unnoticed. 7 
 However, if we are to assess covertness in manipulation, we should ﬁ rst be 
clear about its scope. A quick review of some elements that may remain covert 
in a manipulative message shows that many diﬀ erent things can be deemed to 
be covert:
cautiously assume that what makes a statement manipulative is the speciﬁ c type of processing it 
calls for (see below). Moreover, if we were to loosen van Dijk’s criterion and assume that manipu-
lation violates  some hearer interest (whatever it may be), the feature would lose its predictive 
power yielding a model which would overgenerate (since most utterances are bound to run 
against at least one of the hearer’s many interests). 
 7 Th is intuition is actually reﬂ ected in natural language. Take the following pair of examples: 
  (a)  Let me persuade you to come to the cinema with me. 
  (b)  ?? Let me manipulate you to come to the cinema with me. 
While it sounds perfectly natural to utter something like (a), the acceptability of an utterance such 
as (b), which goes on record, turns out to be problematic, because covertness indeed seems to be 
356 D. Maillat and S. Oswald / International Review of Pragmatics 1 (2009) 348–370
•  the overall manipulative intention : as noted above, the transparency of the 
manipulative attempt would seemingly compromise its success, making it 
crucial for the manipulative intention to remain concealed;
•  local and basic linguistic strategies : a linguistic device relying for instance on 
particular pronominal usages (e.g.  us vs. them ) could aim at surreptitiously 
establishing an in-group/out-group ideological discrimination, which in 
turn may inﬂ uence further beliefs and behaviour;
•  global strategies : these strategies aim at creating adequate psychological and 
social conditions, such as controlled peer pressure or strategies designed to 
increase the faith in the speaker;
•  discursive strategies : a complex articulation of speech acts fulﬁ lling a speciﬁ c 
function, e.g. a fallacious argumentative move (see van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004), may also require being covert in order to succeed. 
 We see that a great many aspects of verbal communication can remain 
covert. Th is complexity may compromise the operability of the criterion of 
covertness in an account of manipulation, insofar as diﬀ erent instances of 
manipulation may display diﬀ erent types of covertness. Such an enterprise 
runs the risk of being diﬃ  cult to circumscribe in a model, given the heteroge-
neity of the set of variables. Some refer to psychological and cognitive phe-
nomena (speaker intentionality), others to social issues (peer pressure, group 
behaviour), and others are about particular linguistic or discursive mecha-
nisms (local and global strategies). In other words, the major diﬃ  culty we face 
in the applicability of covertness as a distinctive feature is a consequence of its 
problematic deﬁ nitional range. 
 One way out of the problem would be to consider that these multifarious 
aspects of covertness in communication can be addressed through an exami-
nation of the particular processing the manipulative message calls for, since, in 
the end, their eﬀ ect – or power – is only realised when an addressee processes 
the information conveyed by the manipulative argument. Also, a list like the 
above points to the need for multidisciplinary eﬀ orts in the study of argumen-
tative phenomena like manipulation as it ranges over psychological, sociolo-
gical, linguistic, pragmatic, and even anthropological parameters. Such an 
enterprise is starting to develop; Clément ( 2006 ), for instance, reconciles soci-
ological, anthropological and cognitive aspects of belief ﬁ xation, and credu -
lity in particular; however, to our knowledge there has been no attempt to 
crucial in manipulation (unless, of course, we take (b) to be meta-linguistically intended to 
produce a humorous eﬀ ect). In Gricean terms (Grice, 1989), this observation amounts to saying 
that manipulation is an instance of Gricean  “unostentatious violation” , (1989: 30). 
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integrate these various aspects into one consistent model. It is our purpose to 
sketch out the lines along which such an enterprise could be carried out within 
a pragmatic framework. 
 But for the time being, and coming back to the topic of covertness in 
manipulation, let us mention a further problem we would face, and which 
emerges from psychological evidence (e.g. Barton & Sanford,  1993 ; see in 
section 3 below the discussion of the Moses illusion). Th e results obtained 
through experimental designs to test the extent to which speciﬁ c, crucial, lexi-
cal information is or is not accessed by subjects while interpreting a fairly 
simple narrative text revealed that even when they are warned about a poten-
tially manipulative content (i.e. when they are told for instance that there are 
anomalies in the text), the anomalies may still go unnoticed, and the manipu-
lative eﬀ ect would still be achieved. Th is kind of observation would support 
the idea that covertness may not even be a necessary condition of manipula-
tion, since in cases where you neutralise it by making addressees aware of the 
manipulative nature of the utterance, manipulation can still take place. While 
it could be said that the text did not explicitly alert the subjects to the lexical 
nature of the anomaly, we see nevertheless that a higher degree of awareness to 
covert strategies is not suﬃ  cient to undermine manipulative attempts. It 
remains to be seen how a more precise warning would have led to a failure of 
the manipulative intent. 
 All in all, manipulation indeed seems to rely on covertness most of the time, 
but the notion remains diﬃ  cult to capture within a theoretical model and 
proves somewhat shaky to be systematically integrated in a descriptive account, 
at least if we wish to use it as a discriminatory criterion, as many other types 
of speech acts also require covertness (e.g. lies). While we wish to maintain 
that manipulation must be covert, the very diﬃ  culty involved in systemati-
cally establishing the nature, role and scope of covertness in manipulative 
communication makes it a diﬃ  cult feature to integrate in a descriptive 
model. 
 1.4. Social Inequality 
 Research in Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. van Dijk, 2006) and in psychoso-
cial science (e.g. Milgram, 2004; Cialdini,  2009 ) stresses the importance of the 
social conditions manipulative communication builds on. According to van 
Dijk, manipulators “need to satisfy personal and social criteria that enable 
them to inﬂ uence others in the ﬁ rst place” (2006: 362), whereby it is assumed 
that asymmetrical social conditions of interaction are required for manipula-
tion to take place. Typically, this is illustrated by an asymmetry between speaker 
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and addressee(s) in hierarchical social positions (parent/child, professor/pupil, 
politician/member of the public, etc.), knowledge availability (highly edu-
cated/poorly educated people, scientist/non-scientist, expert/non-expert, etc.), 
access to public discourse, and so on. Underlying this view is the idea that 
manipulation exploits these forms of social asymmetry and the associated 
imbalance in the relations of power and domination in favour of the 
manipulator. 
 While we do not deny that social parameters indeed contribute to success-
ful manipulation, there are reasons to doubt that these are necessary condi-
tions. Th ey certainly make explicit certain conditions under which 
manipulation occurs, but in our view they are not powerful enough to iden-
tify all cases of manipulation. Th e justiﬁ cation for this is that we see no 
compelling reasons to straightforwardly exclude that manipulation could 
occur in the absence of prior social domination: in principle, we do not see 
why children could not manipulate their parents, why friends could not 
manipulate each other, why pupils could not manipulate their professors, 
etc. More importantly, on the one hand, a socially powerful individual or 
group may very well decide not to use manipulation when attempting to 
convince another, subordinate group; on the other hand, manipulation can 
obtain within reverse social power relations. In other words, social asymme-
try does not  necessarily entail manipulation. Van Dijk is aware of the diﬃ  -
culty but dismisses these cases on the grounds that they hinge upon personal 
psychological factors:
 I limit my analysis to social criteria, and ignore the inﬂ uence of psychological fac-
tors, such as character traits, intelligence, learning, etc. In other words, I am not 
interested here in what might be a ‘manipulating personality’, or in the speciﬁ c 
personal way by which people manipulate others. (van Dijk, 2006: 362) 
 It is interesting to highlight the fact that van Dijk both recognises and dis-
misses a non-social component in manipulative strategies since he identiﬁ es 
two aspects of manipulation, that is, its social and psychological underpin-
nings. We propose that a suitable model for manipulative discourse should try 
to cater for both aspects. 
 Th e same quote also reveals that his conception of manipulation is  speaker-
oriented , for he associates the psychological feature of manipulation to the 
personality of the speaker. We contend that while it is desirable to include 
the psychological component of manipulation, the latter is not reducible to 
the speaker’s personality. We argue further that the crucial psychological aspect 
of manipulation lies in the way it constrains the addressee’s interpretative pro-
cesses. In this respect, we propose that an appropriate pragmatic model of 
manipulation must shift its focus on and account for the cognitive (psycho-
logical) processes which underlie the interpretation of manipulative discourse. 
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Th at is to say that we propose a deﬁ nition of manipulation which is  addressee-
oriented . However, this does not rule out the relevance of social factors in the 
suggested account. Rather, we want to consider how these – together with 
other parameters – may eﬀ ectively constrain the addressee’s processing of the 
manipulative utterance. 
 In doing so we wish to avoid van Dijk’s more restricted view of manipulation – 
expressed below – in order to be able to account for a wider range of cases:
 […] if manipulation is a form of domination or power abuse, […] it only makes 
sense to speak of manipulation, as deﬁ ned, when speakers or writers are manipu-
lating others in their role as a member of a dominant collectivity. (van Dijk 
2006: 364) 
 We will see in section 2, how a more comprehensive view of manipulative 
communication can extend van Dijk’s account in order to be able to deal with 
cases of manipulation that go beyond relations of social dominance. 
 1.5. Intention 
 Another speaker-oriented parameter which has been regarded as relevant to 
research on manipulation, though a highly problematic one from a descriptive 
point of view, is intentionality. Is manipulation intentional? Providing a nega-
tive answer to this question amounts to considering that people may acciden-
tally manipulate others. Such a position may turn out to be rather hard to 
defend: in addition to having to deal with the diﬃ  culty involved in account-
ing for an accidentally-occurring phenomenon, such a line would also leave us 
in a theoretical dead end as it would rule out the notion of covertness dis-
cussed above and assumed by the majority of researchers in the ﬁ eld, as we 
would have to explain how a speaker can hide something she is not even aware 
of. We will therefore assume that there is some deliberate deceptive intention 
involved in manipulation. 
 Th e centrality of a deceptive intention in manipulation bridges the gap 
between theories of argumentation and pragmatic accounts which consider 
intention as a central aspect of communication (particularly in the ﬁ eld 
of post- and neo-Gricean pragmatics, e.g. Carston,  2002 ; Levinson,  2000 ; 
Sperber & Wilson,  1995 ). Th e latter may thus represent an interesting option 
for an account of manipulation (as argued more generally for argumentation 
by Cummings (2004: 178ﬀ   )). Speciﬁ cally, manipulation proceeds like any 
other communicative exchange as an attempt on the part of the addressee to 
retrieve the speaker’s intention, but relies crucially on a mismatch between 
speaker intention and the intention attributed to her by the addressee. Since 
manipulation is taken to be covert, it would be paradoxical to assume that it 
is based on an implicature derived from an intention which is, by deﬁ nition, 
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not meant to be communicated, let alone recognised; this would be inconsis-
tent with the core assumptions underlying contemporary pragmatic research. 
 Given that the persons who are the targets of manipulation are not aware that 
they are being manipulated, we assume that their processing of the speaker’s 
utterance is completely straightforward, and in particular that hearers assume 
speaker cooperativeness (in the Gricean sense). In other words, from the 
addressee’s point of view, the type of processing involved in cases of standard, 
cooperative, communication and in cases of manipulation is the same: the dif-
ference is rather to be found at the speaker’s end of the communicative process. 
Th is is also the conclusion Attardo ( 1997 ) arrives at. He states that in competi-
tive modes of interaction (among which we ﬁ nd manipulation), “parties exploit 
the assumption of cooperation to further their unilateral goals” (1997: 778). 
 Furthermore, we claim that the focus of the account should be on the cog-
nitive processes of interpretation. Th e issue such an approach will have to deal 
with is therefore not so much an assessment of the non-recovery of the manip-
ulative intention (inasmuch as the latter does not have a  communicative status) 
than an assessment of how it is that the hearer’s mental processing of informa-
tion, in manipulative communication, takes a somewhat “undue” path. As 
pointed out by Rigotti ( 2005 : 69), “the dynamics of manipulation are very 
close to the dynamics of human error”. It is precisely this assumption that will 
underlie our discussion of manipulative communication. Our claim is that 
manipulation exploits the way our mechanisms of information processing 
work; that is, a necessarily imperfect and biased way. 
 Yet, there are at least two counts on which an addressee-oriented model 
which does not depend, at a descriptive level, on the notion of a deceptive 
intention can provide a serious alternative when accounting for manipulation:
   i)  how could intention-based approaches capture cases of second-hand manip-
ulation, where a credulous – already successfully manipulated – disciple 
repeats a manipulative creed? In other words, how can they handle cases 
where the result of the exchange may turn out to be the same as the result 
of manipulation, when there was no actual manipulative intention on behalf 
of the speaker? 
 ii)  how would they account for cases of manipulation where the manipulator’s 
goal is merely to distract the hearer from relevant information? Th ese cases, 
an example of which we will see further on (see section 4 below), do not have 
an actual manipulative content, because the speaker is not aiming at convey-
ing a particular set of representations, but rather at preventing the hearer 
from forming speciﬁ c representations. 
 Th e example of second-hand manipulation might be regarded as controver-
sial in so far as its manipulative nature is concerned. Can we still consider it as 
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a proper instance of manipulation? Two answers can be provided to this thorny 
issue: ﬁ rst, it could be considered that the manipulated speaker, who propa-
gates the manipulative speech, is relaying the original information, and thus it 
is as if the original (“ﬁ rst-hand”) manipulative intention is indirectly relayed 
through the disciple’s speech though not intended as such by her. Second, if 
we deﬁ ne manipulation as a set of conditions limiting the interpretative pro-
cesses of the addressee instead of a property of the communicative intention, 
we ﬁ nd ourselves in a position to capture the intuitively correct fact that 
whoever listens to the disciple can indeed be  manipulated . 
 We cannot think of any strong reasons to refute the hypothesis that the 
same (originally manipulative) message will possibly yield the same represen-
tations, even if produced by a speaker with no manipulative intention. Since 
a given hearer will process a manipulative message following the standard 
cooperative procedure, the idea is not to consider the manipulative message 
from the perspective of its potential distinctive features (such as the manipula-
tive intention), but rather from the perspective of the particular type of pro-
cessing it calls for. In this sense our deﬁ nition tries to capture the cognitive 
experience associated with manipulation. 
 In order to explore this new direction, as we will see in the following sec-
tion, we will postulate that manipulation can be best deﬁ ned in terms of the 
constraints it imposes on mental processing: the hypothesis we will defend 
consists in shifting the focus from the type of concern evoked throughout the 
previous subsections to conditions aﬀ ecting the reception of a manipulative 
message; speciﬁ cally, we will deﬁ ne manipulation as a set of constraints limit-
ing the processes of contextual selection. Instead of concentrating on the fea-
tures of the manipulative message by trying to characterise it from the 
perspective of the manipulator, we will reverse the angle and consider manipu-
lation from the perspective of the manipulated. We will thus investigate how 
manipulated hearers are (mis)led to process the information contained in the 
message in a somewhat restricted way. Th is move, we claim, will do away with 
the complexity expounded above in the discussion of the deﬁ ning criteria of 
manipulation, while allowing us to determine a set of recurrent features which 
characterises manipulation in a large variety of cases. 
 2. An Alternative Account 
 We argue that a more appropriate and explanatorily more powerful account of 
manipulation can be couched in the framework of Relevance Th eory. In the 
remaining sections we will show how a new theoretical model of manipulation 
can be captured in relevance-theoretic terms, and how the latter can help us 
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understand both the more standard forms of manipulative discourse, as well as 
the more marginal forms. 
 According to Sperber & Wilson ( 1995 ), human communication relies on 
the assumption that all utterances are optimally relevant within the speciﬁ c 
context in which they are produced. Optimal relevance is understood as a 
cognitive state which corresponds to an optimal ratio between the cognitive 
eﬀ orts required to process the utterance, and the cognitive eﬀ ects yielded by 
such an interpretative process. Our account of manipulative discourse pro-
poses that manipulation takes advantage of and exploits the cognitive dynam-
ics which underlie this mechanism. Crucially, whereas many accounts assume 
that manipulation is a form of inherently ﬂ awed communicative activity, we 
argue that, from an interpretative perspective, manipulative discourse relies on 
the same context-construction or context selection procedure as in the case of 
a “normal” utterance. Th e communicative twist introduced by manipulative 
discourse lies in the external restrictions or constraints imposed by the manip-
ulator on the interpretative process, even though the process itself remains 
unchanged. 
 Th is argument is to be related to another claim made by Allott & Rubio 
Fernández (2002) who show that the interpretation of certain lexical items 
can lead to “cognitive shortcuts” whereby the addressee only activates the most 
salient conceptual assumptions related with a lexical entry, a phenomenon 
known as  shallow processing . Shallow processing gives rise to so-called  ad hoc 
concepts , that is to say concepts which do not correspond to the fully-ﬂ edged 
set of conceptual assumptions that correspond to a full exploitation of the 
concept but to a contextually tailor-cut, targeted interpretation. 
 According to Allott & Rubio Fernández (2002), this cognitive tendency 
displayed during interpretation sheds a new light on phenomena such as the 
Moses illusion 8 by providing a systematic account to cases where cognitive 
processing can lead to an erroneous/misled interpretation. 
 In order to address the initial question “what is manipulation?”, we want to 
posit that manipulation corresponds to a communicative strategy that relies 
on these exact same processes and exploits the cognitive strategies deployed 
during interpretation in order to optimise the use of resources. In other words, 
manipulative discourse is a form of communication that puts the addressee in 
a situation where s/he will be led to shallow-process contextual assumptions. 
Manipulation, therefore, constitutes a form of cognitive constraint on the 
selection of contextual assumptions. 
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 In the proposed model, manipulative discourse functions as a twofold pro-
cess that ﬁ rst puts a strong constraint on the selection of contextual assump-
tions which are accessed to interpret a target utterance  U . Th is ﬁ rst constraining 
element ensures that the target utterance is interpreted within a limited con-
text,  C , and – most importantly – it ensures that any alternative set of contex-
tual assumptions,  C  ′, is  not accessed. Th at is to say that manipulative discourse 
is a form of communicative attempt at blocking the context selection process 
described by Sperber & Wilson ( 1995 ) in the following quotation, and which 
is at the heart of interpretation:
 Humans […] try to process information as productively as possible; that is, they 
try to obtain from each new item of information as great a contextual eﬀ ect as 
possible for as small a processing eﬀ ort. Th e assessment of relevance is not the goal 
of the comprehension process, but only a means to an end […].
 If this is true, it suggests a complete reversal of the order of events in compre-
hension. It is not that ﬁ rst context is determined, and then relevance is assessed. 
[…] it is relevance which is treated as given, and context which is treated as a vari-
able. (141-142) 
 Coming back to what we proposed before, manipulation is reanalysed as an 
attempt to limit and, hence, misguide the latter process of context selection in 
order to control the comprehension of some target utterance. While we recog-
nise two diﬀ erent components in a manipulative use of language, they do not 
need to be distinct discursively and can be combined within a single utterance 
as we will see later on when we look more closely at an actual example. 
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between on the one hand, the 
constraining and inherently manipulative move and the (often) innocuous 
target utterance whose interpretation is being constrained on the other hand. 
 Interestingly, such an account is capable of explaining both standard cases 
of manipulative discourse as well as cases of “second-hand manipulation” (see 
above). As an example of the latter type of manipulation, we can think of a 
situation where the creed of a revisionist group is being relayed by some of its 
disciples even though they are not aware of the controlling – and therefore 
misleading – attempt which is built into it. In other words, a speaker can 
manipulate others unaware, as the disciples mentioned here would. To put it 
diﬀ erently, as manipulation is now deﬁ ned as a blocking action on context 
selection procedures during the interpretation of an utterance, it follows that 
the eﬀ ect can be triggered unintentionally. 
 As was already noted before, while we couch our theoretical proposal within 
a pragmatic model, we take manipulation to be essentially a cognitive process, 
which successfully misleads context selection. As a result, in line with the views 
expressed in the RT literature, we make the claim that manipulation transcends 
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language and is best explained at a more fundamental level, namely cognition. 
In this respect, there is a strong adequacy between the cognitive framework 
used to ground Relevance Th eory and the claim we are making here. 
Furthermore, the cognitive line taken in this paper also allows us to explore 
some ﬁ ndings made in adjacent domains and open new perspectives on model-
ling manipulative discourse. We think in particular of the experimental work 
carried out in the ﬁ eld of cognitive psychology (see Pohl,  2004 ). 
 Th e diﬀ erent papers collected in Pohl ( 2004 ) show that human cognition is 
exposed to cognitive illusions, i.e. situations in which cognitive processes are 
being misled by a variety of factors. Moreover, it is shown how these “fallacy 
and bias eﬀ ects” can be experimentally tested and replicated. In our account, 
manipulative discourse is assumed to be a linguistic reﬂ ection of these under-
lying cognitive bias eﬀ ects. 
 We already touched upon the so-called Moses illusions (see e.g. Allott & 
Rubio Fernández, 2002) in which an addressee is tricked into answering a 
question and fails to notice a referential “ﬂ aw” in an interrogative utterance. 
Consider the following utterance:
 (1)  How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark? (adapted 
from Reder & Kusbit,  1991 ) 
 When asked to tackle such a question most people will answer “two” and miss 
the anomaly which renders (1) if not meaningless at least trivial. Namely, Moses 
was never involved in the biblical episode of the Flood. Noah was (Park & 
Reder, 2004). 
 In an experimental design testing the impact that (1) and other similar illu-
sions have on people, Erickson & Mattson ( 1981 ) found that up to two thirds of 
the subjects who were tested would miss the anomaly and be tricked into answer-
ing “two”. As discussed in Allott & Rubio Fernández (2002) and more recently 
in Park & Reder (2004), several arguments can be put forward that could account 
for such misled interpretations. Allott & Rubio Fernández (2002) argue strongly 
for a pragmatic explanation of these phenomena and propose that they are traces 
of a form of  shallow processing that ensues logically from the general principles 
governing human communication and in particular the principle of relevance. 
 3. Contextual Selection and Shallow Processing: Insights from Relevance 
Th eory 
 Let us look at the kind of descriptions and predictions achieved by such a 
model. As we saw, Relevance Th eory (see Sperber & Wilson,  1995 ) provides 
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a model for standard inferential communication which draws on the assumption 
that speaker meaning is arrived at through the contextualisation of the utterance 
that is being interpreted. Contextualisation refers to the construction of the 
appropriate context. Th is process is governed by a principle of optimal relevance 
whereby the addressee tries to maximise the cognitive eﬀ ects he can generate 
from the utterance while minimising the cognitive eﬀ orts he has to put into the 
construction of the appropriate context of interpretation. Th ey write that
 [h]umans are not in the business of simply assessing the relevance of new informa-
tion. Th ey try to process information as productively as possible; that is, they try 
to obtain from each new item of information as great a contextual eﬀ ect as possible 
for as small a processing eﬀ ort. Th e assessment of relevance is not the goal of the 
comprehension process, but only a means to an end, the end being to maximise the 
relevance of any information being processed. (Sperber & Wilson,  1995 : 141) 
 Furthermore, contextualisation is regarded as an incremental process by 
which new layers of contextual assumptions are accessed if – and only if – the 
processing of the target utterance has not reached a level of optimal relevance. 
Th at is to say that contextualisation, or context selection, will gradually add to 
the set of contextual assumptions brought to bear in the interpretation of the 
target utterance, in a stepwise manner, provided a possible point of optimal 
relevance has not been reached. 
 Sperber and Wilson ( 1995 ) point out that this conceptualisation of utter-
ance interpretation assumes an inclusion relation between diﬀ erent possible 
sets of contextual assumptions, and crucially they argue that this inclusion 
relation corresponds to an accessibility relation. In other words, the relevance-
theoretic framework implicitly posits that if you can make some contextual 
assumptions more accessible, they will be more likely to be part of the ﬁ nal 
contextual selection set than others. 
 Th us, coming back to the deﬁ nition of manipulation, in this framework, a 
manipulative speaker will be taken to increase the accessibility of a certain 
subset of contextual assumptions,  C , within which the target utterance will be 
almost inevitably processed (from a cognitive perspective), so as to ensure that 
the addressee does not process the target utterance within a larger context,  C  ′, 
in which it might appear inconsistent or contradictory with some prior back-
ground knowledge he upholds. Th e crucial element in this analysis of manipu-
lative discourse lies in the manipulator’s attempt to prevent the addressee from 
accessing some other less accessible contextual assumptions. 
 If we go back to the ﬁ ndings put forward by Erickson & Mattson ( 1981 ), we 
realise that the proposed model explains their ﬁ ndings in a straightforward man-
ner. When they analyse the Moses illusions data, Allott & Rubio Fernández (2002) 
argue that the addressee will only summon some contextual assumptions when 
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interpreting (1), thereby shallow constructing an  ad hoc concept in which only 
some (minimal) assumptions associated with  Moses are activated, for example: 
 (2)  MOSES*: Biblical ﬁ gure, 
 as opposed to
 (3)  MOSES: Person who led the people of Israel out of Egypt. 
 While the notion of an  ad hoc concept is interesting to understand the out-
come of the interpretation, our model focuses on the process that leads to such 
shallow interpretation. In this instance, the cognitive processing of Moses illu-
sions is aﬀ ected by the fact that the addressee/subject is busy performing a 
question-answering task and is therefore assessing relevance in connection with 
the task at hand. Also as the experiment exploits a playful setting in which the 
subject is challenged in a way, his cognitive eﬀ ort is concentrated on providing 
an answer which overrides possible contextual discrepancies. Interestingly, 
while in most cases the cognitive shortcut described goes unnoticed by the 
subject, in some instances people exposed to Moses illusions will report spot-
ting the inconsistency and consciously overriding it in order to complete the 
task. Th e kind of minimal contextual assumption we are alluding to is echoed 
in Sperber & Wilson’s (1995: 265) revision of their framework, when they 
distinguish a category of  positive cognitive eﬀ ect which is characterised as 
“contribut[ing] positively to the fulﬁ llment of cognitive functions or goals”. 
In this case, the  ad hoc concept constitutes such a positive cognitive eﬀ ect in 
relation to the fulﬁ llment of the discursive goal, i.e. answering the question. 
 Coming back to our model of manipulative discourse, the Moses illusions 
are a good example of a form of utterance that both prevents the addressee 
from accessing certain contextual assumptions and ensures that the target 
utterance – (1) itself in this instance – is interpreted within that limited set 
of contextual assumptions (a set which includes MOSES* but leaves out 
MOSES). As we can see the suggested account explains in a straightforward 
fashion well-known manipulative processes by means of a cognitively grounded 
analysis. It is also equipped to handle recent infamous examples of manipula-
tion that we are all familiar with. 
 4. A Concrete Example 
 A striking case of manipulation that took place in the US in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon conve-
niently attracted a lot of attention from the media. It puts in broad daylight 
 D. Maillat and S. Oswald / International Review of Pragmatics 1 (2009) 348–370    367
 9 A good review of the events is available from the  Washington Post at  http://www.washingtonpost
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manipulative practices which would typically go unnoticed. Th e whole aﬀ air 
made the headlines in 2003 and again in 2005 through the Libby scandal. 9 In 
2002, Valerie Plame’s husband, Joseph Wilson, worked for the CIA and was 
part of an eﬀ ort, initiated by Vice-president D. Cheney, to ﬁ nd evidence that 
Iraq was somehow involved in terrorist threats against the US in connection 
with the 9/11 attacks. Wilson, a former US ambassador, was one of the per-
sons hired to investigate a lead which linked Iraq with Niger in an attempt to 
buy uranium for nuclear weapons. Wilson’s investigation dismissed the lead as 
dubious. However, and crucially in our attempt to understand manipulative 
strategies, the then-president G.W. Bush in his State of the Union address on 
28 January 2003 claimed that “the British government has learned that 
Saddam Hussein recently sought signiﬁ cant quantities of uranium from 
Africa”. Th at is to say that the intelligence gathered on these allegations had 
been plainly ignored by the government. Th is prompted Wilson to make a 
public comment about the misleading use of available intelligence on these 
issues. A series of retaliating actions orchestrated by one of D. Cheney’s aides 
(Libby) led to a full exposure of the aﬀ air in the press. 
 In view of what was suggested before, the manipulative technique used here 
can be analysed in a transparent way. Th e US government needed a case to go 
to war against Iraq and they manipulated the American public into interpret-
ing the relevance of a war against Iraq within a very speciﬁ c limited context: 
that of terrorist attacks against America. In this instance, the strategy used 
consisted in constraining the set of contextual assumptions summoned for the 
interpretation of the target utterance (4): 
 (4)  We must wage war against Iraq 
 As is obvious from the synopsis provided above, we see that the ﬁ rst manip-
ulative step consists in establishing a link between terrorist attacks and Iraq, 
thereby limiting the context selection process to  C= {9/11}. In the wake of 
9/11, the US government was actively trying to establish terrorist threats as 
the relevant context concerning Iraq. 
 Interestingly, by the time the second US-led invasion of Iraq started, a 
nationwide survey showed that roughly half of the American population 
thought that Saddam Hussein was connected with the 9/11 events. In other 
words, the strategy had been extremely successful. 
 In this prototypical example, the theoretical model proposed for manipula-
tion applies straightforwardly, as we notice an initial attempt to constrain the 
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context of interpretation of a target utterance, eﬀ ectively blocking access to a 
context  C  ′ in which Iraq is  not involved in any terrorist activity of the kind 
that led to 9/11. Th e deliberate attempt to constrain context selection is pat-
ent in Bush’s statement which ignores the conclusions of Wilson’s report. 
 Th e cognitive explanation of such a strategy relies on the special status that 
a set of contextual assumptions such as those associated with 9/11 has from a 
cognitive point of view. Pickrell et al. ( 2004 : 352-353) explain, using 9/11 as 
a case in point, that some contexts constitute “highly salient memories, […] 
or memories that some theorists have dubbed ‘ﬂ ashbulb memories’ for their 
highly emotional, meaningful, and subjectively permanent nature”. By link-
ing Saddam Hussein to terrorist attacks like 9/11, the manipulator tries to 
ensure that the target utterance  U =  We must wage war against Iraq is inter-
preted in,  C , the constrained, emotionally overwhelming ﬂ ashbulb context 
of 9/11. 
 More generally, this example shows that a key to context selection con-
straint, and therefore manipulation, relies on salience. Typically, the strategy 
adopted by a manipulator in order to prevent the addressee from accessing an 
extended set of contextual assumptions,  C  ′, makes use of highly salient con-
textual assumptions which will ensure that a degree of optimal relevance is 
reached before an extended context is constructed. Flashbulb contexts achieve 
this particular eﬀ ect of course, but we do expect the generalisation to hold 
across other types of highly salient contexts. In the relevance-theoretic frame-
work, we expect two forms of high salience. First, there will be contextual 
assumptions which require less eﬀ ort to be accessed. Second, some contextual 
assumptions will yield greater cognitive eﬀ ects. In both cases, a subset  C con-
sisting of precisely these assumptions will be more salient and therefore func-
tion as a context selection constraining device. 10 
 Finally, coming back to our earlier example of second-hand manipulation, 
we see how a credulous disciple can still be indirectly manipulative, in spite of 
his not having the manipulative intention which is part of the initial strategy. 
Our account readily allows for an analysis of second-hand manipulation as it 
does not rely directly on the communicative intention. Th us, a credulous dis-
ciple can eﬀ ectively manipulate other addressees by producing the same con-
textual constraint as the initial manipulator in spite of the fact that the former 
might not be aware of the availability of another extended set of contextual 
assumptions. 
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 5. Conclusion: Cognitive Optimism 
 Sperber, Cara & Girotto (1995) propose an interesting view of the cognitive 
underpinnings of the quest for optimal relevance. In particular, they convinc-
ingly argue that there is an inherent ﬂ aw, in a sense, in the cognitive processes 
which govern the construction of an appropriate set of contextual assump-
tions. More precisely, in order to increase the performance of the interpreta-
tive system, humans tend to take cognitive shortcuts. Sperber, Cara & Girotto 
write that 
 […] people are nearly-incorrigible “cognitive optimists”. Th ey take for granted 
that their spontaneous cognitive processes are highly reliable, and that the output 
of these processes does not need re-checking. (1995: 90) 
 Our pragmatic approach of manipulation shows that it is precisely this 
kind of cognitive optimism which is exploited by manipulative strategies. 
Speciﬁ cally, manipulation is an attempt at misleading the addressee which 
ensures that only a limited set of contextual assumptions is accessed by taking 
advantage of her/his cognitive optimism. 
 To conclude, we hope to have shown that such an approach oﬀ ers a poten-
tially greater descriptive and explanatory power than other traditional 
accounts in capturing manipulative strategies. Also, this account seems capa-
ble of handling cases and manipulative scenarios which do not ﬁ t into other 
models. More importantly, our proposal anchors a pragmatic model of 
manipulation in the wider ﬁ eld of cognitive psychology and provides an 
experimentally testable cognitive hypothesis which opens up new perspec-
tives in our understanding of manipulative discourse. 
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